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Abstract
This study aimed to describe the land rights of bussiness permit for timber utilization from community forest
plantation (IUPHHK-HTR) in Indonesia and to predict its effectiveness based on property rights theory related
to target group characteristics. Field survey was conducted in November 2008 to April 2009 in Riau and South
Kalimantan Provinces. The results showed that from the property rights theory perspective, the land rights for
HTR could be categorized as lease or management rights consisted of rights to exclude, to manage, to use, and
to access, without rights to transfer and to bequeath. This suggests that the mechanism of transfer of rights from
the government to the holder of IUPHHK-HTR as a temporary transfer of rights. As a result, the government needs
to regulate a rigid and detailed obligation for IUPHHK-HTR holders that may not be fulfilled by the farmers. The
granting of permits for a long period (up to 95 years) is predicted to lose the meanings, caused of the prohibition
on inheritance of the permits. From these findings it is predicted to reduce the interest of farmers to invest in the
HTR.
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Introduction
Community forest plantation (HTR) is forest plantation
on production forest established by individuals or coopera-
tive who live in or adjacent to the forests to improve the
potentials and quality of production forest by applying silvi-
culture in order to ensure the sustainability of forest resources
(Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.23/Menhut-II/2007 on Ap-
plication Procedures for Business Permit for Timber Utiliza-
tion from Community Forest Plantation in Plantation Forest
jo P.5/Menhut-II/2008 on the Amendment of P.23/Menhut-II/
2007, hereinafter referred to Ministry of Forestry Regulation
P. 23/2007 jo P.5/2008).  Areas that can be developed for  plan-
tation forests with HTR scheme is the unproductive area of
production forest that is not burdened with other license/
rights and location close to forest products industry is pre-
ferred. From such limitations, basically the establishment of
HTR can be interpreted as providing access to the people
who live in or adjacent to forests to actively invest in forest
plantations in production forest areas through the mecha-
nism of business permit for timber utilization from community
forest plantation (IUPHHK-HTR).  The target for forest utili-
zation for small-scale forest concessions including HTR in
production forest areas according to National Forestry Plan
(RKTN) 2011–2030 is 5.17 million ha (Ministry of Forestry
Regulation P.49/Menhut-II/2011 on RKTN 2011–2030 ).
A variety of certainty is required such as the certainty of
market, price, and business to encourage a willingness to
invest, especially those involving the private sector as well
as farmers. One form of business certainty is the certainty of
property rights of production factors including land.  Libecap
(2009) mentions that the improvement of property rights in
open access resources can reduce over use, increases
investment and trade as well as receives compensations.
Therefore, in various countries, improvements of such
property rights are set as a priority policy, in particular to
encourage the development of small-scale forest management
that involves the community. Such improvements are not just
happening in developing countries, but also occur in
developed countries. For example, in Canada, improvement
of property rights was carried out through Woodlot Licenses
and Community Forest Agreement (Ambus et al. 2007),
whereas China uses Household Responsibility System (Zhang
et al. 2000; Dachang 2001).
Property rights are the rights of the individual, commu-
nity or the state of a resource (asset/endowment) to manage,
acquire the benefits, and transfer of property (Eggertson 1990;
Alston & Mueller 2008). These rights are implications of the
relationship between resources and the actors involved in
the utilization of the resources, meaning that if the actor stands
alone without any resources being used, or available resources
without any actors to exploit them, then the definition of
property rights is not required. Thus, property rights are the
bundle of rights that are governed by certain rules. The rules
are set forth in the institution, where institution is the rule of
the game, norms, prohibitions, and regulations/legislation that
regulate and control the behaviour of individuals in the
community or organizations (North 1990). Institutional is built
to reduce the uncertainty in the control of environment
(Menard 2008) and to inhibit the emergence of opportunistic
and harmful behaviours, so that human behaviour in
maximizing their individual welfare is more predictable
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(Kasper & Streit 1998). Thus, property rights are institutional,
because it contains the norms and rules of the game and
regulator of relationships between individuals.
It should be acknowledge that not all institutional arrange-
ments can inhibit the emergence of opportunistic and
harmful behaviours. If the institutional arrangements cannot
inhibit the emergence of opportunistic and harmful behaviours,
it can be said that such institutional arrangements have
failed to achieve common goals in establishing societal
interdependency (bebrayan agung in Javanese). By study-
ing various cases in various locations and types of resource
management, Anderies et al. (2004) concluded that there are
7 principles to achieve institutional reliability. The first prin-
ciple is clearly defined boundaries between resource and us-
ers and this would help identify who should receive benefits
and pay costs, since uncertainty will lead to distrust between
the beneficiaries and discourage interests in making invest-
ment. The second principle is proportionality between the
benefits a resource user obtain and his/her contributions to
ensure fair procedure in the social system. The third principle
is decisions to establish resource utilization and protection
can be made by the local users accompanied by enforced
rules will be more effective and efficient, since decisions are
made based on more perfect information and deviations will
be sanctioned. The fourth principle is the control over re-
sources and behaviour of members should be accountable
and/or carried out by their own. The fifth principle is that
members who violate the rules are subjected to strict and
graduated sanctioning. The sixth principle is conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms. The seventh principle is the formal rights
to run the local institutions (principles 1–6) are not hampered
by regulations and government bureaucracy and other exter-
nal parties.
Providing opportunities for the communities to establish
HTR through IUPHHK-HTR mechanism has resulted in the
transfer of rights from the government to the communities in
and around forests that are framed by Ministry of Forestry
Regulation No. 23/2007 jo P.5/2008. One product of this trans-
fer of rights is rights to land as described by Schlager and
Ostrom (1992) as “... rights are the product of rules ...”. This
study describes land rights from the policy of providing for
the community to establish forest plantations in production
forest area  through the HTR scheme and predict its effec-
tiveness based on property rights theory associated with the
characteristics of the communities in and around the forests,
especially in the vicinity the projected area for the develop-
ment of HTR.
Methods
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) divide the rights of property
rights into 5 types namely access, withdrawal, management,
exclusion, and alienation. From the standpoint of environ-
mental economics, a right can be said to be perfect in the
sense that it can encourage its efficient allocation and utiliza-
tion, if the rights are transferable, excludable, and enforce-
able (Turner et al. 1994). In Indonesia, the term of trasferability
consists of 2 rights, that is, the right to resell and to bequeath
including to donate. By combining the 2 concepts within the
context of Indonesia, these rights can be divided into 6 rights,
specifically the right to buy and sell, bequeath/donate, exclu-
sion, management, withdrawal, and access. The more the
bundle of rights is owned by a person or a group, the more
ideal is the property right, thus more efficient allocation can
be expected (Alston & Mueller 2008). The bundle of rights to
buy and sell, bequeath/donate, exclusion, management,
withdrawal, and access can be categorized as private
property. While the bundle of rights comprised of exclusion,
management, withdrawal and access, is categorized as
management rights.  Meanwhile, if it includes rights to
withdrawal and access can be categorized as the right to with-
drawal of, and if the right to enter is the only right, then it is
categorized as access rights. Certanty of rights are the condi-
tion to achieve effective and efficient utilization of common-
pool resources that produces high-value benefits as with
most forest resources (Ostrom 2008) and will encourage the
willingness to invest.
Based on the above theoretical framework and research
objectives, basically this research is a descriptive research,
that is, research that aims to explain something in depth (Irawan
2007) and extensive (Elliott 2005). Content analysis on HTR-
related policies and regulations was done to describe land
rights. The analysis focussed on Ministry of Forestry Regu-
lation No. 23/2007 jo P.5/2008 and would be clarified by the
Government Regulation No. 6/2007 on Forest Arrangement
and Formulation of Forest Management Planning and Forest
Utilization jo Government Regulation No.3/2008 concerning
Amendment to Government Regulation No. 6 / 2007 (herein-
after referred to as Government Regulation No. 6/2007 jo Gov-
ernment Regulation No. 3/2008) and Law No. 41 of 1999 on
Forestry (hereinafter referred to as Law 41/1999). To view the
compatibility between the regulations and characteristics of
target groups, analysis of the farmers’ characteristics, their
land utilization and tenure were performed. Based on this in-
formation, further analysis performed on the pattern of inter-
action to predict the effectiveness of institutional arrange-
ments for land rights under the HTR scheme.
To determine the characteristics of the target groups, field
research was conducted from November 2008 to April 2009 in
the villages of Lubuk Gardens, Situgal, and Rambahan (Logas
Tanah Darat Sub-District, Singingi Kuantan District of Riau
Province) and Ranggang Village (located in Takisung Sub-
district) and Asem Jaya Village (Jorong Sub-district) located
in Tanah Laut District, South Kalimantan Province. Structured
interview technique with the help of a questionnaire was
conducted to determine the household characteristics,
utilization and land tenure. The number of respondents in
Riau Province study site was 94 people and 107 people in
South Kalimantan Province.
Results and Discussion
Characteristics of farmers, land utilization and land tenure
Characteristics of farmers referred to in this study included
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T able 1  Cha racteristi cs of respondents i n t he  st udy site s 
D etail s Charact eristics of re spondents  Ria u s tudy si te  South Kal imanta n study site 
Age <  30 yea rs: 10%  
30–49 yea rs: 65%  
>  50 yea rs: 25%  
< 30 years: 7%  
30–49 years: 58%  
> 50 years: 35%  
Educ ation le ve l Did not graduate  from 
ele me ntary  sc hool : 30% 
ele me ntary–junior h igh sc hool:  
60% 
senior high school and above: 
10% 
D id not graduate from 
e lementary school: 9%  
e lementary–junior high school: 
73%  
senior high sc hool  and above : 
18%  
Occupat ion/main l ivelihood Farmers:  86%  
Others: 14%  
Farme rs: 63%  
Others : 37%  
Total  asset <  Rp20 mil lions: 86% 
>  Rp20 mil lions: 14% 
< Rp20 mill ions: 76%  
> Rp20 mill ions: 24%  
 
age, education level, main livelihood, and total asset of the
respondents.  Results of household survey in the study sites
are presented in Table 1.
Distribution of land use in Riau study sites were presented
in Figure 1 and in Figure 2 for study sites in South Kalimantan.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicated that about one third of the
lands owned were utilized for community forests (HR). This
amount will be more extensive if mixed farms with forest trees
and rubber plantations which were also considered as woody
plants were categorized as HR. Looking at such phenomena,
it can be seen that the cultivation of woody perennials is not
something that is alien to the community at the study sites.
Of the 94 respondents in Riau, there were 322 parcels of
land or an average of 3–4 parcels per farmer. Based on owner-
ship rights, these parcels were generally (98%) self-owned
(private property), and the rest (2%) belonged to the parents
and land owned by others (Figure 3). While in South
Kalimantan, out of 107 respondents there were 359 parcels of
land or an average of 3 parcels per farmer. Based on property
rights, these parcels were generally (95%) self-owned, while
the rest (5%) belonged to the parents, land leased and
 
 
Figure 3  Property rights in Riau study sites. 
 
Parents owned:   
4 ; 1% 
Other 's property:  
4 ; 1%  
Self-owned:  
314 ; 98% 
property of others (Figure 4).
History of the acquisition of these parcels of land owned
by the respondent in Riau study sites were presented in
Figure 5 and in Figure 6 for South Kalimantan study sites.
 
Figure 1  Distribution of land utilization in Riau study  
 sites.  
Homegarden:  
6.3 ; 2% 
Shrub;  14.0 ; 
3% 
Private HR:  5.0 ; 1% 
HR partnership:  
148.0 ; 37% 
Rubber:  
223.1 ; 55% 
Palm oil:  
9.5 ; 2% 
 
 
Figure  2   Distribution of land utilizatio n in South 
Kalimantan study sites. 
Shrub: 
15.3; 5% Ho megarden: 
39.8; 13% 
Rice-field: 
46.3; 16% 
Mixed garden: 
67.3; 23% 
HR: 78.4; 
27% 
Palm oil: 
3.3; 1% 
Rubber: 
43.7; 15% 
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Figure  4   Property rights in South Kalimantan study sites. 
Parents owned:  
3 ; 1% 
Land leased:  
7 ; 2% Other's property:  
8 ; 2% 
Self-owned:  
340 ; 95% 
Figure 5  Land acquisition in Riau study sites. 
Other parties' 
permit: 4 ; 1% 
Inheritance;  
57 ; 18% 
Purchase:  
77 ; 24% 
Forest clearance;  
129 ; 40% 
Government's 
permit: 55 ; 17% 
 
Figure 6  Land acquisition in South Kalimantan study sites. 
Government's 
permit; 83; 
23% 
Leased: 7; 2% Forest clearance: 
2; 1% 
Inheritance: 
47; 13% 
Purchase:  
221; 61% 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 above indicated that the acquisition
of parcels of land in Riau study sites were generally derived
from forest clearance (40%), whereas in South Kalimantan
study sites, they were generally derived from purchase (61%).
This showed that land resources that could be accessed by
local users in Riau study sites were relatively abundant com-
pared to those in South Kalimantan. This was clarified through
observations made which indicated that South Kalimantan
study site were generally open lands (shrubs and weeds),
which although looked barren (idle land) but basically were
proprietary, while in Riau study sites there were still many
secondary state-owned forest area that were not managed
nor encumbered with rights. Nevertheless, the abundant land
resources in Riau study sites has begun to show scarce, es-
pecially in easily accessible lands. This was indicated by the
relative large land acquisition through purchases (24%).
State property rights in many cases were very vulnerable
to open access resources with unclear property rights or
termed by Chichilnisky (2005) as ill-defined property rights.
In such circumstances, it is very vulnerable to be used by
unrightfully parties. Consequently, the phenomenon of
illegal logging and forest encroachment occurred in forest
resources management, illegal mining phenomena occurred
in mining management, and illegal fishing phenomenon
occurred in marine management. Let alone the management
of forest resources, mining, and marine fisheries which were
generally located at remote locations from the centres of policy
makers, the phenomenon of corruption of national budget
and break-ins of government Banks have occurred close to
the centre of  decision-makings.
Other means of land acquisition were to inherit and
government’s permit. In Riau, inheritance reached 18% and
13% in South Kalimantan. This suggested that inheritance
was a form of transfer of rights which were commonly
practiced in Sumatra Malay community (Surwansyah 2005)
and the Dayaks of Kalimantan, in particular West Kalimantan
(Pranadji 2005). So important is inheritance for the people of
Indonesia (formerly Dutch East Indies) for the Dutch colonial
government to acknowledge and regulated it on law on
plantation (Cultuurwet) F.v.d Putte (1863–1874) which was
then considered very progressive by the statement that
“inherited personal use rights (erfelijk individueel gebrui)”
must be guaranteed (Tjondronegoro 1996).
In both study sites, the acquisition of permits from the
government has also been known as a form of transfer of
rights over land they currently own/manage. Acquisition of
land with government’s permit mechanism found in Riau
covered 17% of which were generally obtained from the
village government for land partnership for community forest
development with one of the industrial plantation forest (HTI)
company and the area were divided equally by the village,
that is 2 ha per house hold. Those lands were originally agri-
cultural lands that were abandoned by their owners and
subsequently occupied by the village. While in South
Kalimantan, such means of land acquisition covered 23% of
which were obtained from the Central Government (Ministry
of Transmigration) as lands for migrants. Such land gains
were very possible. North (1990) mentions that one way of
land acquisition rights is through the arrangement of
government’s administration.
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The policy of providing access to the community to establish
forest plantations in production forest area through HTR
development HTR  Scheme is geared to utilize production
forest area and did not/have not been encumbered with rights
(KTDH). Currently, there were 13.4 million ha of KTDH. On
KTDH areas that were still virgin forest and good quality
logged over area (LOA), the policy is directed to encourage
investment of intensive silviculture (Silin), while on damaged
LOA, the policy was directed to development of HTI and
HTR. The target allocation of reserves 2007–2010 was 5.4
million ha, with a planting target of 200,000 ha per year since
2007 and it is expected that by 2016 the whole area of HTR
reserve can be planted (Directorate of Forestry Production
Development 2007). This target was revised in 2011–2030
RKTN to 5.17 million ha (Ministry of Forestry Regulation
P.49/Menhut-II/2011) and not only intended for HTR but also
for other small-scale forest utilization schemes such as
village forest (HD) and community forestry (HKm). However,
as of 30 April 2011, the total reserve area of HTR was 650,663
ha distributed over the 26 provinces and 103 districts/cities.
While IUPHHK-HTR issued by the regent was 126,295 ha
(Sub Directorate of Community Forest Plantation 2011).
Development of HTR aimed to provide wider access of
forest utilization to the local community to increase their
welfare, to increase the potential and quality of production
forest, to ensure the sustainability of forest resources and to
resolve tenurial conflict permanently (Ministry of Forestry
Regulation No. 23/2007).  IUPHHK-HTR can be given to indi-
viduals and cooperatives, in which the cooperative is a co-
operative referred to in the scale of micro, small, and medium
which is built by people who live in or around the forest. For
individual IUPHHK-HTR, the largest total area that could be
given to each head of family applicants was 15 ha, whereas
for cooperative, the total area was adjusted to their business
capabilities.
IUPHHK-HTR issued by regent/mayor on behalf of the
Minister of Forestry on the recommendation of the village
head and consideration of the head of technical implementa-
tion unit (UPT). The length of IUPHHK-HTR period at the
most was 60 years (Ministry of Forestry Regulation No. 23/
2007 jo P.5/2008) and according to Government Regulation
No. 3/2008 could be extended once for 35 years. Such permits
could not be bought and sold, transferred, and inherited as
well as could not be used as collateral. Timber utilization
activities of HTR in plantation forest included land prepara-
tion, seeding, planting, maintenance,  harvesting, and mar-
keting, in addition included processing based on Govern-
ment Regulation No. 3/2008. The plantations (trees) that grow
in IUPHHK in HTR were assets to the business permit hold-
ers and could be used as collateral.
Issuance of IUPHHK-HTR by the government is the
embodiment of the provisions of Law 41/1999 which states
that one of the government authority is to regulate and deter-
mine legal relations between people and forest, and   regulate
the legal actions concerning forestry (Article 4, Verse1.c),
where utilization of production forest were carried out through
business permits, one of which is timber utilization permit
(Article 28, Verse 2) and each permit holder were subject to
business license fees, provisions, reforestation funding, and
performance bonds (Article 35, Verse 1). To ensure fairness,
equity and sustainability, forest utilization permits were lim-
ited by considering forest conservation and business
certainty aspects (Article 31, Verse 1).  Aspects of
sustainability referred to environmental sustainability, pro-
duction sustainability, and implementation of fair, equitable
and transparent social and cultural functions (Explanation of
Article 31, Verse 1). While aspect of business certainties in-
cluded area certainty, time of business certainty and legal
assurance to conduct business (Explanation of Article 31,
Verse 1). While the restrictions mandated to Government Regu-
lation (Article 31, Verse 2) by Law No. 41/1999 was restric-
tions on area, number of business permits, and arrangements
of business locations (Explanation of Article 31, Verse 2).
Provisions of permits utilization translated in Government
Regulation No. 6/2007 jo Government Regulation No. 3/2008
by stating that every activity must be accompanied by forest
utilization permit (Article 19), in conjunction with HTR, such
permits are called IUPHHK-HTR. This permit might be trans-
ferred after obtaining written approval from the permit issuer
(Article 20, Verse 1). Nevertheless, land area with forest utili-
zation permit could not be used as collateral, or pledged to
another party (Article 20, Verse 2). In Government Regulation
No. 3/2008 which is an amendment of Government Regula-
tion No. 7/2007, there are changes associated with land
activity and orientation for HTR. IUPHHK-HTR activities con-
sisted of land preparation, seeding, planting, maintenance,
harvesting, and marketing as well as processing. Lands that
were subjected to IUPHHK-HTR were no longer “unproduc-
tive production forest”, but was changed to “priority on un-
productive forest”meaning that IUPHHK-HTR could be ap-
plied to unproductive production forest.
Referring to the above provisions, it is known that there
were regulations on land rights permits under HTR scheme
on Ministry of Forestry Regulation No. 23/2007 jo P.5/2008
which were consistent with the higher regulations, and some
that were not consistent which comprised of contraction and
expansion of the interpretation of the higher regulations. The
consistent regulations consisted of permit-based forest utili-
zation including for HTR and the permit period. Regulations
that were not consistent under the category of contraction
consisted of restricting the right to transfer, IUPHHK-HTR
activities which do not accommodate processing activities
and land orientation for IUPHHK-HTR. While the inconsis-
tent regulations under the category of expansion of interpre-
tation included restrictions of right (could not be sold, trans-
ferred and inherited according to Ministry of Forestry Regu-
lation No. 23/2007), where according to Law No. 41/1999, the
restrictions were hinted at 3 things, namely, restrictions on
size, number of business permits, and arrangement of busi-
ness locations, not on restricting the rights. Meanwhile, ac-
cording to Government Regulation No. 6/2007 jo Government
Regulation No. 3/2008, IUPHHK is transferable after obtain-
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ing written approval from the permit issuer, but could not be
pledged as warranty, collateral, or pledged to another party.
Thus there appeared to be some inconsistencies between
Ministry of Forestry Regulation, Government Regulation, and
the Forestry Law.
From the standpoint of the theory of property rights, land
rights for HTR as described above were the rights to lease or
manage, because the bundle of rights of the recipient
comprised of exclusion, management, withdrawal and access,
without the rights to sell and buy and to inherit.  Not even be
used as warranty, collateral, or pledged to another party
according to Government Regulation No. 6/2007 jo Govern-
ment Regulation No. 3/2008. Rights to lease was reinforced
with the provision that each business permit holder for forest
utilization were subject to business permit fees, provision,
reforestation fees and performance bonds (Law No. 41/1999)
which could be interpreted as “land rent”.
Patterns of interaction and prediction of institutional
arrangements  Strengthening of the opportunities for
communities in and around the forest to play an active role in
forest management seems to have become a global trend,
which is basically an act of restoration of community rights
uprooted by the hegemony of empire, colonialism and later
by the state. Oyono (2009) reports that in Cameroon in the era
prior to colonialism, land tenure rights were regulated by cus-
tomary/communal law that produces 2 forms of property rights,
that are personal and nucleus family rights resulted from for-
est clearance and communal rights for forests that have not
been cultivated by the community. In the era of colonialism
(1885–1960), forest and uncultivated land that were owned
by the community were acquired by the colonial government
(Germany, France, and UK) where the management was car-
ried out under the colonial laws. In the early era of indepen-
dence (1960) to forestry reform (1994), such colonial laws
continued and even expanded and strengthened through  con-
cessionary commercial and industrial logging, which conse-
quently marginalized the communities and only gained the
use rights. After the forest reforms marked by the enactment
of the Cameroon Forestry Act (Forestry Law 1994), it opened
the opportunity for the communities to manage forests
through community forest schemes with certain rights to ac-
cess, manage, transfer and exclude. If the strengthening of
the rights in Cameroon began in 1994, in Canada it began in
1950 with the issuance of 37 Farm Woodlot Licences (Ambus
et al. 2007), in India with Joint Forest Management (JFM)
scheme since 1990 (Kant 2005), and in China it began in 1980s
with the Household Responsibility System (HRS) (Zhang et
al. 2000; Dachang 2001).
In Indonesia, community involvement in developing
forest plantations is a necessity, especially when the policy
is intended for development of forest plantations without
converting natural forests. There were at least 3 explanations.
First, the characteristic of property rights of non-productive
lands that were de facto recognized by local institutions would
be able to maintain and uphold their rights. Development of
forest plantation was ideally geared to improve the produc-
tivity of land by planting idle land and unproductive forest.
Changes in land cover from natural forest to an idle land and
unproductive forest generally occurred due to forest clear-
ance to be cultivated as described previously. Based on the
local institutions outside Java, the party who cleared the for-
est for the first time became the forest owner hence the work
lands became the property of the cultivator (de facto). This
phenomenon might explain why all respondents in Riau study
sites stated that the land acquired from forest clearance were
self-owned. Such situation is in line with the findings by
Saptomo (2004) whom states that in local concept, the rela-
tionship between the local users with the land is determined
by the history of how the lands were worked, recognition by
customary leaders, and testimony of others.  However, since
investment capabilities of rural communities outside Java were
still low, not only financially but also in terms of labour, this
has resulted in the land being left barren and became idle as
though they were not proprietary. If such lands were autho-
rized by the State to large companies (HTI and plantations),
then there would be risk of major land conflict. This would be
avoided by large companies, thus they would be more inter-
ested in converting natural forests rather than working the on
degraded lands.
Second, with the presence of local institutions that recog-
nized land property right that were idle and unproductive
secondary forest, have formed a strong foundation for
community-based plantations and could be expected to be
more sustainable, secure from theft and looting (for example
illegal logging) and would become an incentive to carry out
long-term investment. Gibson et al. (2002) emphasizes that
the de facto institutions (recognized and enforced by local
institutions) is better than the de jure institutions such as
state property. However, to ensure legal certainty, the formal
legitimacy of informal recognition by the state (government)
is still required.
Third, the characteristics of labour intensive in commu-
nity-based forest management could help solve the problem
of unemployment and poverty in rural areas. Most communi-
ties in the countryside (Riau and South Kalimantan study
sites) were farmers at productive ages (30–49 years old).
Moreover, they were have the technical ability of growing
woody plants shown by the distribution of land they own,
where 93% of land owned by the respondents in Riau study
sites were used for woody perennials (HR and rubber), while
in South Kalimantan allocation for woody plants reached 65%
(HR, rubber, and mixed farms). Thus, it could be predicted
that the technical problems in cultivation were not an ob-
stacle to the development of community-based forest man-
agement programme. As signalled by Mayers et al. (2002)
who finds that many of the related problems of sustainable
forest management are not rooted in technical issues, but
instead on the weakness of institutional governance, weak
social institutions and weakness in forestry governance.
Analysis of land property rights showed that land rights
on HTR scheme was the rights to lease or manage. Leasehold
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indicated that the mechanism of transfer of rights from the
government to the holder of IUPHHK-HTR was a temporary
transfer of rights. On temporary transfer of rights, such as
leases, it is necessary to set out how resources owned should
be treated by the receiver/tenant (Eggertsson 1990). The logic
is that a person who leases the asset would always write
down the things that can and can not be done by the tenants
in the lease contract. From such logic, then Ministry of For-
estry Regulation No. 23/2007 jo P.5/2008 regulated in detail
about the rights and obligations of IUPHHK-HTR holders.
According to this regulation, the rights of IUPHHK-HTR hold-
ers included conducting activities in line to the permit, ac-
cess to funds for financing the construction of HTR, techni-
cal guidance and counselling, and opportunities to market-
ing of forest products. To run these rights, they were re-
quired to (1) prepare the managment plan (RKU) IUPHHK-
HTR no later than 1 year after the permit was issued, (2) pre-
pare the annual work plan (RKT) at least 2 months prior to the
RKT of the current year, (3) in the case of IUPHHK-HTR
holders borrowed HTR development funds from P2H Central
BLU, the holder is obligated to repay the loan, (4) implement
the administration of forest products, (5) carried out mea-
surements and defining the species of forest products, and
(6) implement silvicultural systems based on location and
type of plants that are developed. Taking into account the
characteristics of the local users that were on average low
educated, farmer by profession and has limited amount of
wealth, it could be predicted that these obligations were dif-
ficult to be met, even if the government provide funding as-
sistance.
As explained above, the allocated areas for HTR were
non-productive production forest due to forest clearing in
the form of cultivated land where de facto (recognized by the
local institutions) belonged to the person whom cleared the
forest for the first time and has the full rights to sell, transfer,
bequeath, exclude, manage, withdraw, and access. With
IUPHHK-HTR scheme, the full rights of such land owners
would be limited to the rights of lease/manage that could not
be sold, transferred and inherited. In such situations, it could
be predicted that the communities would not be interested in
enrolling their lands to become the areas for IUPHHK-HTR.
Moreover, based on experience (Figure 5 and Figure 6), ac-
quisition of lands by way of lease and worked the land owned
by others were not common (less than 2% of the land parcels
which they own). Even if they already have experience with
land acquisition through government regulation, however
their rights were not the rights to lease/management, but
evolved into private property with a complete set of rights.
The given timeframe of 60 years and could be extended
once up to 35 years under Government Regulation No. 3/
2008 seemed to be the main incentives to attract farmers. How-
ever, with the dominant age of the candidate receiving the
IUPHHK-HTR that ranged  between 30–49 years old and even
some more than 50 years, long period of time (up to 95 years)
would eventually lose their meaning with the restriction to
inherit, considering the average life expectancy in Indonesia
on the average is 70.6 years in 2009 (Grehenson 2009). In
contrast to the plantation rights (HGU) that has a complete
bundle of rights, although the limited period is 20–35 years,
but was able to push the rights holders to behave sustainably,
and not exploitative of their resources. For example, there
never been any facts where a rubber plantation, tapped rub-
ber trees from the base to the top branches although the
market price of rubber was expensive. Provided that plant
cycle could be technically accommodated, it seemed that land
rights issues were not with regard to the length of the period
of permit, but on the perfection of the bundle of rights that
were transferred.
Conclusions
From the standpoint of property rights theory, land rights
for HTR is the right of lease or manage the bundle of rights for
exclusion, management, withdrawal and access, without the
right to sell, transfer and inherit. Such rights indicated that
the mechanism of transfer of rights from the government to
the holder of IUPHHK-HTR was a temporary transfer of rights.
This required the government to regulate the rigid and
detailed obligations, similar to the obligations imposed on
large plantations (HPH and HTI). From these findings, in the
end, land rights policy to develop forest plantation in pro-
duction forest through HTR scheme could be predicted to be
ineffective. Rights to lease/manage accompanied by obliga-
tions that were not able to be borne by the recipients of the
rights could be expected to lower the interests of farmers to
invest in HTR. Forestry investments that have the character-
istic of long-term investment require a perfection of the rights
to reduce business uncertainty.  Nevertheless, it was realized
that this study had not been able to address the most effec-
tive land rights for HTR scheme, since to determine the most
effective scheme, it is required to have a complete data and
information on the motives of land tenure, political networks
(local, regional and national), the growing discourses and
real implications of most probable alternatives. It appeared
from this study and analysis of other similar research results,
it could be said that a single policy (one size fits for all policy)
for rights to develop community-based forest plantation would
reduce the effectiveness of the policy itself.
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